

Democratic Governance and Economic Development: A Comparative Study of African Countries

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Abstract

This study examined democratic governance and African economic development from 2000-2019. The objective was to compare democratic governance and development of selected African countries. Time series data was sourced from World Bank data base. Economic development was measured by per capita income, life expectancy rate, human development index and gross domestic products. The countries used in the study were Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, Gambia, Angola, Kenya and Ethiopia. Descriptive statistics was used to illustrate the movement of the variables within the study scope. The study found that democratic governance has volatile effect on economic development of African countries. We recommend that for African development, governments need a long-term perspective of effective institution building for structural transformation. Democracy should not be viewed as the dictatorship of the majority but the protection of the minority by taking into account their preoccupations

Keywords: *Democratic Governance, Economic Development, African Countries*

INTRODUCTION

The factors that determine economic development of developing countries like Nigeria have long been a matter of concern among policy makers and economists. Achieving sustainable economic development has been the policy thrust of Nigerian government. The Foundation for Democracy in Africa (FDA) is a development organization committed to promoting participatory democracy, economic growth and sustainable development throughout Africa (Bates and Block 2010: p.67). Democracy is very important to economic development because it helps to structure a government with the ability to deliver economic development with people's human rights at heart. When democracy goes along with economic development, citizens are confident to have a share of the proceeds of development.

In democratic governments, people are made to have a sense of belonging as they are empowered to demand and shape good policies, express grievances, seek justice, and hold leaders and the private sector accountable for their stewardships (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: p.69). Legally stable economies will favour both internal and foreign investors. It is then obvious that since

dictators, like some African Heads of states who have been in power for more than 30 years, are susceptible to succession crisis and fear of the future, they often change the constitution to suit their position in power. Actually, there has been a great deal of debate on democracy and development which will be clearly examined in this work. Some authors, like Lipset (1959) suggested that economic development triggers change which promotes democracy. This means when people acquire wealth via economic development, they tend to seek out freedom via democracy. This therefore, implies that poor people who are not empowered by wealth have no power to seek freedom via democracy.

Africa's democratic experiments are many and complex and include entrenching constitutionalism and the reconstruction of the postcolonial state. To move Africa forward, emerging democratic governments would have to confront a legacy of poverty, illiteracy, militarization, and underdevelopment produced by incompetent or corrupt governments (Dunning, 2004. p.78). The challenges confronting Africa's democratic experiments are many and complex and include entrenching constitutionalism and the reconstruction of the postcolonial state; ensuring that the armed forces are permanently kept out of politics, instituting structures for the effective management of natural resources; promoting sustainable development and political stability; nurturing effective leadership, and safeguarding human rights and the rule of law.

It is apparent from the foregoing sections that the evolution of democracy in Africa has coincided roughly with the continent's growth and development. When the measures of democracy deteriorated on the aggregate in the 1980s, so did growth and the various economic and development outcomes. And, when the measures improved as of the late 1980s or early 1990s, so also did these outcomes (Gibson and Long, 2012: p. 90). A closer examination reveals further that improvements, especially in growth and per capita GDP where the data is much more complete, occurred with a slight lag. For instance, most of the improvements in the democracy indicators often began roughly about the late 1980s or very early 1990s, consistent with the post-cold war period (Dunning, 2004:p.88). Meanwhile, growth resurgence for instance, began in the mid-1990s. Such evidence, however, is only qualitative and much too gross.

Democracy and development have spawned a huge amount of literature over the years. Democracy and development in Africa, however, have been gaining increasing importance since the generally disastrous economic outcomes in Africa during the 'lost decade' of the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, governance has long been suspected as a major impediment to African economic development (Odofin, 2007: p. 96-97). This suspicion came to the fore in the late 1970s, however, when African economies began to suffer major setbacks during post-independence. In a 1981 study, commissioned by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), the Berg Report (Berg, 1981), weak governance was highlighted as a major culprit responsible for Africa's poor state of economic health. The proposed solutions were to improve economic governance. A number of African countries also undertook political reforms, partially in support of economic governance, but also in response to donors' demands for such reforms in exchange for external aid.

These reforms political governance were principally democratic in nature. The importance of political governance was also highlighted in a study by the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). Ndulu et al., (2008a, 2008b:56-64) concluded that poor governance had led to growth-inhibiting policy syndromes while improved governance resulted in greater prevalence of growth-enhancing syndrome-free regimes (Ndulu et al., 2008a, 2008b). In a more recent study of country cases globally (Fosu, 2013d: p. 50), governance was flagged as the most prominent element in the strategies for achieving economic successes in the developing world. Particularly for African countries, the study finds democratic governance as having been crucial in this regard: for example, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa (Fosu, 2013d: p. 78). Democracy is the only one form of political governance, to achieve this feat effortlessly. Nevertheless, the political reforms undertaken by African governments have entailed by and large democratic governance. These reforms were likely boosted by the end of the Cold War beginning about 1990.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Democracy

The concept of democracy is a fluid concept and has received many definitions by scholars either in the classic political studies or in the contemporary world of scholarship. To the former great American President, Abraham Lincoln, democracy portends government of the people, by the people and for the people. However, this definition has faced a lot of confrontations by many scholars who would rather see the same as outmoded. The reasons being that democratic ethos have practically been mismanaged by agents of state through the instrumentalities of coercion and brutal use of force, so much so that the people are now alien to the very values and dictates of the principles of democracy (Odojin, 2007; Bako, 2007; Akinsanya and Erunke 2010). To Appodorai (1974) define democracy as the system, either of government under which the people exercise governmental power directly or indirectly through representatives elected by them. By this standard, a state could be termed democratic if it provides institution for the expression and supremacy of the popular will on basic questions of social directions and policy. Similarly, democracy becomes sustainable in the presence of free, fair and credible elections. It is through periodic elections that potential public office holders (should ordinarily) find their ways into public office. This is what makes the concept critical in this discourse.

Democracy essentially means the rule of the common people (citizens). As explained above, any attempt to define it otherwise is a matter of convenience and may have its roots in the difference between what democracy essentially is and how it is practiced. Defining what constitutes the common people and what constitutes rule have both been the subject of much debate. Calling the common people simply, the people, Robert Dahl questioned how the people are designated (Dahl, 1989, p.3).

Thus, one would expect the democratic reforms in African countries to attenuate political instability. However, the process is hardly linear, as there is the tendency for new democracies to be associated with political disorder, for the transition from autocracy often entails the attenuation of previously rigidly enforced rules against political dissent (Bates, 2006). Furthermore, Collier

and Rohner (2008) argue that while democratic accountability lowers incentives for rebellion, democracy also constrains the technical possibilities of government repression, thus rendering rebellion easier. Hence, the effect of democracy on political violence is likely to be ambiguous. The authors observe that the level of income serves an intermediating role, with lower incomes more likely to result in a positive effect of democracy on political violence (Collier and Rohner 2008, p.84). It is quite possible, though, that the level of democracy associated with low-income countries is also at the low level, which is prone to political disorder to begin with (Bates, 2006). Thus, while intermediate-level democracy tends to be growth-inhibiting advanced-level democracy, accompanied by greater political stability would be growth-enhancing (Fosu, 2008a, 2011, p.39).

Democracy in Nigeria

With the inception of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria in May 29, 1999 after several decades of military dictatorship, there were rising expectations that the newborn democracy will deliver Nigeria from the long decades of savagery and oppression. A vast majority of Nigerians looked with great expectations of better things to come in the process of governance; they looked forward to the freeing of national commonwealth from the stranglehold of greedy public officials and to more effective and efficient programmes of social service delivery in areas of education, health, infrastructural development, poverty alleviation, disease control, unemployment, security. These elements constitute the crux of meaningful human existence for the teeming 150 million Nigerians waiting on the prawl for better days ahead (Erunke, 2007; Omojuwa, 2007; Danfulani, 2007). Apart from the real art of governance which, includes among other things, electioneering, stability of democracy, depends on so many variables. In the first place, there is supposed to exist forward and backward linkages between the rulers and the ruled in the socio-political scheme of things. The leadership concern for the followership reduces suspicion on the part of the latter. This in turn spirals into building a more enhanced culture of trust, harmony and peace between and among the political class and the entire citizenry. Severing the relationship between the people while in office means that social contract is no longer respected, and this could lead to unwanted friction in the society.

Democracy in Nigeria is being starved of the basic tools for survival. There is the dearth of vertical and horizontal compositions of unified interests in terms of sharing of the nation's national cake. There is absence of broad spectrum of what economists call trickledown effect. The nation's wealth concentrates only at the centre while the subordinate units wallow in misery, hunger, squalor and can barely find food and shelter to survive few moments (Tronvoll, 2009, p.100). In Nigeria, government business and all the largesse is the prerogative of select few at the corridors of politics. Politics therefore is strictly a road-map to pilfer and wreck the nation's treasury and go to sleep with impurity (Powell and Thyne, 2011, p.98). Very often, institutions designed to check such oddities have become a cover for witch-hunts of the opposition parties groaning under the weight of supreme powers of the running ruling party. This form of extreme democratic trajectory

symbolizes the death of civility and Nigeria may only be making expensive jokes in her attempt to becoming one of Africa's business hubs in few years from here.

Democracy in South Africa

With the end of apartheid in 1994 the people of South Africa anticipated profound social and economic change. Yet twenty-one years later, much of the population lacks access to proper medical care and education. Despite improved access to clean water, housing, and roads many South Africans feel that too little has changed since the apartheid era. The rainbow nation is still racially divided in its electoral behavior, and the income gap between blacks and whites is greater than it was in 1994. Leading political figures in the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), are often accused of corruption. New political groups are calling for the nationalization and expropriation of land and resources from the white minority. Nevertheless, the constitution enshrines the rule of law, and has popular support across all racial divides.

South Africa's advent to democracy was ushered through the 1993 Interim Constitution, drawn up through negotiations among various political parties, culminating in the country's first non-racial election in 1994. All legally eligible South Africans were able to cast their vote for the first time on 27 April 1994 to mark the end of apartheid rule and establish a new Constitutional order. The year, 2014, marks 20 years of democracy in South Africa, coinciding with the fifth national elections as a democratic country.

The road to democracy in South Africa was marked by centuries of racial and economic discrimination and oppression as well as an unyielding sacrifice and resistance of the oppressed peoples, together with a minority of their White compatriots. Today South Africa is a new society built on a foundation of freedom and democracy. In order to mark these 20 years of democracy, it is important to reflect on some of the key issues/features of the country's young democracy. This feature focuses on a range of aspects such as socio-economic and health policies; formation of new political parties; establishment of institutions such as the Independent Electoral Commission, Public Protectors Office, Labour Court, Equality Court and the Constitutional Court; and major events such as 2010 FIFA World Cup and so on.

Democracy in Ghana

Ghana's democratization odyssey since its "founding" elections in 1992 to the disputed 2012 elections is exemplary, at least, by the standards of the minimalist Schumpeterian conception of democracy and liberal or electoral democracy (Diamond, 1999, p.743). All the core tenets of this model are present and respected in Ghana: political equality anchored in the right of franchise and periodic elections, reasonably free and fair; civil liberties, freedoms, and human rights guaranteed by a constitution which is respected by all Ghanaians as the fundamental law of the land; rule of law adjudicated by a relatively impartial and independent judiciary; separation of powers between the three organs of government (the executive, legislature, and judiciary), free press, and a relatively autonomous and vibrant civil society. All the six elections Ghana held since 1992 have

been relatively peaceful. If Huntington's (1991) two "turn-over" criterion for the consolidation of democracy is correct, Ghana may be considered a consolidated democracy.

Ghana's transition to liberal democracy has encountered many challenges along the road. The most recent one is the petition filed by the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) at the Supreme Court challenging the results of the 2012 presidential election, in which the incumbent president and candidate of National Democratic Congress Party (NDC), John Mahama, was declared the winner by the Ghana Election Commission. The eight month-long trial of the petition deepened the acrimonious political polarization of the country along NPP and NDC lines. The trial was so viciously and maliciously politicized in the media, with almost every decision of the judges given a political spin and tagged with either NDC or NPP biases, that some leading Ghanaians such as Mr. Kofi Annan, the Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu, Reverend Professor Emmanuel Asante, and the Justices of the Supreme Court trying the case had cause to express their worries about the rising political tension in the country because of the trial.

Two of the six elections led to the turn-over of power from the incumbent party to the opposition: first, the landmark 2000 election that saw the rotation of power between the incumbent NDC and the opposition NPP, when the latter won the election in a runoff and the former graciously conceded defeat and handed over power the first time in the political history of Ghana. Second, the 2008 election that was won by the opposition NDC and the NPP reciprocated the grace of its opponent and willingly handed over power despite the razor-thin margin of defeat (less than 1% of the total valid votes cast). Ghana passed another test on the strength of its democratic political stability when the sitting president, John Atta Mills died suddenly in July 2012, a few months to go for the December 2012 elections.

In line with the fourth republic constitution, his vice president, John Mahama was sworn into office as president, safeguarding the stability and continuity of the democratic system in highly fluid and risky political circumstances. Besides the looming danger of reversing the progress of democratization in the likely event that the military exploits the power vacuum to stage a coup, factional and power struggles in the ruling party could have delayed the smooth transition, making the above scenario even more ominous. Note that Atta Mills died at the time when factionalism in the NDC was at a breaking point. Rawlings the founder of the party and his wife became so estranged from the late Atta Mills that they tried unsuccessfully to take the leadership of the party from him; after which the power struggle between their factions became fierce and bitter (Bob-Milliar, 2012, p, 613).

Democracy in Zambia

The most salient political trends and events in Zambia from the formation of the new government in November 1991 through its re-election in 1996 to the present, the coalition of forces and personalities that came together in the MMD intellectuals and trade unionists, lawyers, prominent farmers and businessmen, some politicians who had long been disaffected from UNIP and others

who jumped ship only when they saw the political tide running strongly away from UNIP exhibited various ideological persuasions.

Some displayed few obvious political principles at all. The coalition's intrinsically unstable nature soon became apparent. A succession of MMD cabinet ministers and Members of Parliament resigned or were removed from office; a number left the MMD to form other parties. Unfulfilled personal ambitions mixed with dissatisfaction at Chiluba's leadership provide common threads explaining these movements. UNIP survived. But, notwithstanding the existence of more than 30 registered political parties, no new political grouping with a broad enough base and the resources to mount a serious electoral challenge across the country has emerged to seriously threaten Chiluba and MMD. Thus, since 1991 Zambia has been a one-and-a-half party system plus a few bit-players, although as 2001, the year of the next general elections comes closer, there could be realignments in the political opposition to MMD and new presidential aspirants may emerge.

UNIP has not yet recovered politically from the resounding defeat in 1991, which confined its parliamentary representation to just one of Zambia's nine provinces, Eastern Province. The UNIP government's serious mismanagement of the country's economy during the 1970s and 1980s and the accompanying marked deterioration in social conditions and increased foreign indebtedness will not be forgotten easily (Burnell, N.D). The party seems unable to devise a distinctive and credible new programme and fresh identity, confining itself to populist appeals that hold the government and its willingness to pursue neo-liberal economic policies responsible for the great economic and social hardship in the country. Having stood down from the party leadership in January 1992 Kaunda engineered his return in 1995 in circumstances that confirmed bitter divisions over the issue of who should lead the party - divisions that persist to the present day. Nevertheless, by 1995 Kaunda and UNIP seemed capable of staging a modest political revival, having won several parliamentary by-elections outside of Eastern Province. They threatened to capitalize on the decline in the government's popularity brought about by: repeated corruption scandals; the rise in casualties from the privatization and restructuring of industry; and the continuing deterioration in conditions experienced by the majority of small peasant farmers, who were adversely affected by the authorities' bungling attempts to replace the state purchasing of maize by a market-based arrangement.

Democracy in Ethiopia

Ethiopians were first exposed to democracy in 1994 when a new ethnically based federal constitution provided for multiparty elections and a parliamentary system at the national level, with a division of powers between the central and regional governments. In almost all other instances of transitions away from autocratic rule in Africa since 1989, the society in question had some prior experience with multiparty elections and representative government in the early post-independence period, or even with limited referenda and elected legislative councils in the late colonial period. By contrast, a direct transition from monarchy to Marxist-Leninist one-party rule

precluded Ethiopians from any experience with, or opportunity to learn about, democracy (Robert and Mulu, 2016, p.2-4).

Ethiopia presents the analyst with a distinctive history of autocracy as well as extremely low levels of socioeconomic development. Ethiopians have a long and unique experience with autocratic government. After 2,000 years of monarchic rule, the last sovereign, Emperor Haile Selassie I, was overthrown in 1974, after 44 years on the throne. However, the popular uprising against Selassie was followed by a repressive military dictatorship, marked by a devastating civil war that lasted for 17 years under the Marxist Derg of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Mengistu was in turn ousted by a coalition of ethnically based rebel groups that as the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), formed a transitional government in May 1991.

Moreover, EPRDF ideologists have promoted an official doctrine of revolutionary democracy (*abyotawi* democracy in the Amharic language). This doctrine redefines democracy to emphasize mass participation and group consensus while minimizing the importance of individual freedom and choice. Deriving from the experience of armed struggle, the official version of democracy rejects most core liberal principles such as free speech, open elections, and the rule of law.

Instead, the operating principle is democratic centralism, whereby decisions made at higher levels of a vanguard party are transmitted downward to disciplined mass organizations. As such, to an extent possibly exceeded in any other African country, Ethiopian citizens are indoctrinated in an interpretation of democracy that is the exact opposite of liberalism. The doctrine remains powerful as a fighting tool to exclude internal and external enemies (Bach, 2011, p. 657; Tronvoll, 2009). Indeed, by essentially denying the possibility of alternation of rulers by election, the official ideology of revolutionary democracy helps to underwrite the resilience of authoritarian rule.

While the country has now held five multiparty elections, the ruling EPRDF has become increasingly dominant. Since the first election in May 1995, which made Meles Zenawi prime minister, the *de facto* one-party regime has won four successive election victories. Opposition parties managed to secure 105 of 547 House of Peoples' Representatives seats in the 2005 federal election, but they called the integrity of the vote into question and rejected the results. Post-election protests degenerated into violence and a major government crackdown in which civilians were killed and opposition leaders, human rights activists, and journalists were imprisoned on treason charges. In 2010, the opposition was almost eliminated electorally, winning only one constituency and a single legislative seat (Robert and Mulu, 2016, p.2-4). The EPRDF's electoral dominance is facilitated by the well-known disproportionality of popular votes to seats created by the country's first-past-the-post electoral system (Ishiyama, 2009, p.34). Most recently, in 2015, the EPRDF and its coalition allies managed to consolidate their monopolistic hold over representative institutions at the federal centre by sweeping each and every parliamentary seat, which turned an already compliant legislature into a moribund one.

The well-organized ruling party has captured other institutions of the state as well. The EPRDF relies on extensive control of the public bureaucracy to distribute patronage resources to loyal

followers. The party-state network extends from federal to regional to *wereda* (district) and *kebele* (lowest administrative unit) levels. Through this network, party appointees mobilize rural voters and monitor and control local communities (International Crisis Group, 2009). A community surveillance regime known as the 5:1 system gathers information on the day-to-day activities of households and individuals (Human Rights Watch, 2014 and 2010), a practice that has contributed to a climate of mutual distrust (especially) in central parts of the country (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 19).

Democracy in Angola

Angola was part of the third wave of democratisation that began to roll over sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s. Substantial political and economic reforms, including multiparty elections, were introduced in the country as part of a peace settlement designed to consolidate strife-free political competition and set the country on a path to democracy. However, the resumption of the civil war in the aftermath of Angola's founding elections in 1992 blocked the country's trajectory towards the consolidation of a democratic dispensation, leaving it in 'an ambiguous state of transition' (Hodges 2004, p. 47). The end of the armed conflict in 2002 renewed hopes for normal democratic development through a return to electoral politics.

The Angolan polity has seen great changes since the end of the armed conflict in 2002. The most important of these changes is unquestionably the arrival of peace, which acts as a precondition for the development of any political community, and in the case of Angola has led to a resumption of the democratization process. The following examples illustrate the progress that the country has made towards the development of a truly democratic political system. These include the organization of three consecutive electoral processes, the promulgation of a brand-new constitution, and the schedule of the country's long-awaited first local elections for 2020. Since the end of their civil war Angolans have been to the polls on three occasions, namely in 2008, 2012 and 2017. Several political parties participated in these elections, which confirmed the electoral domination of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

The 2017 electoral process is particularly important because of the politics of presidential succession (Pearce et al. 2018, 78-79). After almost four decades in power, President Dos Santos decided not to stand again for re-election, thus paving the way for a new head of state, President João Lourenço. Angola's post-war era has also seen the promulgation of a new constitution. Prior to the approval of the new constitution in 2010, a constitutional law (enacted in 1991 and revised in 1992) regulated all public and private affairs in the Angolan polity. The document had a provisional character, as at the time of its approval it had been expected that a new constitution would be negotiated by the legislature emerging from the country's first multiparty elections held in 1992. However, this did not happen due to the resumption of the civil war in the aftermath of the elections. Consequently, the approval of a new constitution in 2010 brought this protracted constitution-making process to a conclusion.

Democracy in Gambia

The Gambia is one of the smallest and most densely populated countries in Africa. Its borders were established along the bank of the Gambia River in 1965, after gaining independence from the United Kingdom, and the country has functioned as the continent's longest multi-party democracy since its independence. However, in 1994, the nation's first president, Sir Dawda Jawara, was overthrown in a military coup led by a young Lieutenant, Yahya Jammeh. Jammeh's initial two-month-interim turned-22-year rule was characterized by excessive human rights violations and repressive laws on freedom of expression, along with another classic authoritarian trademark: violent unfair and rigged election. Violence and human rights violations escalated exponentially over the course of Jammeh's presidency, and a heightened climate of fear in The Gambia attributed to a violent, failed military coup against him in 2014. This incident led to intensified government repression and violence, but also was a key factor in the organization of a successful opposition coalition and in the mobilization of Gambians to demand a new leader.

Economic Development

Economic development measures the welfare of the citizens of a nation such as human development index, physical quality of life, life expectancy and literacy level. Conceptually, economic development refers to a discontinuous and spontaneous change in the stationary state which forever altered and displaced the equilibrium state previously existing (Schumpeters, 1911, p.89). Economic development is important because an underdeveloped economy is characterized by general poverty, unemployment and disguised unemployment, underdeveloped natural resources, dualistic economy, economic backwardness, insufficient capital equipment and technological backwardness (Jhingan, 2005, p. 89-92).

METHODOLOGY

The objective of this study was to examine democratic governance and development of African countries. This study adopted descriptive method; this involves the use of graphs and bar charts to illustrate the level of financial literacy. The study described the following indicators of development:

Per capita income of African countries: Per Capita Income or average income measures the average income earned per person in a given area in a specified year. It is calculated by dividing the area's total income by its total population.

Life expectancy: Long life represents the well-being or better living standard of a nation, as life expectancy has direct link with social welfare, human health and economic development (Lomborg, 2002, p.47). In recent years, life expectancy shows increasing trends at world level although its rate is different to countries. This improvement in life expectancy is because of better working and living environments, preventative as well as maternal care, increasing education and

rising per capita income. Life expectancy also gives the details of health measures of a nation which is affected by many socio-economic and environmental factors.

Human Development Index: Human Development Index is a statistic composite index of life expectancy, education and Per Capita Income indicators, which are used to rank countries into four tiers of human development.

Gross Domestic Product: is a monetary measure of the market value of all the final goods and services produced in a specific time period.

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSES OF DATA

The following tables have details of development indicators for six African countries from 2000-2019.

Table 1: Comparative Analyses of Per Capita Income of Seven African Countries

Year	Nigeria	Angola	Gambia	South Africa	Kenya	Ethiopia	Zambia
2000	567.93	556.886	594.152	3,032.427	397.483	124.461	345.69
2001	590.382	527.334	585.42	2,666.475	395.33	120.766	382.941
2002	741.748	741.748	411.772	2,502.277	389.543	111.927	382.242
2003	795.386	795.386	335.906	3,751.283	429.788	119.49	435.458
2004	1,007.874	982.961	642.755	4,833.623	451.669	136.466	538.592
2005	1,268.383	1,225.564	665.722	5,383.657	511.616	162.433	702.741
2006	1,656.425	1,902.422	662.362	5,602.011	685.955	194.687	1,647.919
2007	1,883.461	3,121.996	780.38	6,095.622	825.667	244.286	1,124.291
2008	2,242.872	4,080.941	924.512	5,760.805	902.07	326.437	1,394.001
2009	1,891.335	3,122.781	833.28	5,862.797	905.132	380.569	1,159.908
2010	2,292.445	3,587.884	860.638	7,326.616	951.688	341.554	1,489.459
2011	2,520.404	4,615.468	762.761	7,501.47	971.633	354.48	1,672.908
2012	2,786.992	5,100.095	742.781	7,894.102	1,136.871	467.078	1,763.073
2013	2,998.073	5,254.882	742.78	6,832.457	1,200.388	499.532	1,878.907
2014	3,222.694	4,081.841	700.515	6,433.187	1,315.805	566.926	1,763.057
2015	2,730.43	4,166.98	649.511	5,734.634	1,336.883	640.541	1,337.796
2016	2,176.0	3,506.071	683.998	5,272.918	1,410.528	717.125	1,280.579
2017	1,968.56	4,095.813	676.656	6,132.48	1,572.335	470.00	1,534.865
2018	2,032.73	3,289.647	712.512	6,374.028	1,572.335	768.522	1,556.334
2019	2,229.853	2,973.591	751.295	6,001.401	1,816.547	857.501	1,291.343




Figure 1: Trend Analyses of per capita income of Seven African Countries

From the above table, it can be concluded that South Africa has the highest per capita income, second by Angola, the third country is Nigeria, followed by Zambia, Kenya, Gambia and the lowest is Ethiopia.

Table 2: Comparative Analyses of Life Expectancy Rate of Seven African Countries

Year	Nigeria	Angola	Gambia	South Africa	Kenya	Ethiopia	Zambia
2000	46.38	46.61	55.75	56.94	51.74	51.86	44.42
2001	46.56	47.09	56.14	55.93	51.72	52.45	44.95
2002	46.75	47.57	56.54	54.91	51.71	53.03	45.48
2003	46.94	48.05	56.94	53.90	51.69	53.61	46.01
2004	47.50	48.98	57.32	54.06	53.05	54.70	47.16
2005	48.07	49.91	57.70	54.22	54.41	55.80	48.31
2006	48.63	50.83	58.09	54.38	55.77	56.89	49.45
2007	49.20	51.76	58.47	54.54	57.13	57.99	50.60
2008	49.76	52.69	58.85	54.70	58.49	59.08	51.75
2009	50.20	53.70	59.14	55.95	59.38	60.00	53.26
2010	50.64	54.71	59.44	57.20	60.26	60.93	54.77

2011	51.07	55.72	59.73	58.45	61.15	61.85	56.27
2012	51.51	56.73	60.03	59.70	62.03	62.78	57.78
2013	51.95	57.74	60.32	60.95	62.92	63.70	59.29
2014	52.44	58.30	60.56	61.48	63.57	64.15	60.08
2015	52.84	58.86	60.81	62.02	64.22	64.61	60.88
2016	53.29	59.42	61.05	62.55	64.88	65.06	61.67
2017	53.73	59.98	61.30	63.09	65.53	65.52	62.47
2018	54.18	60.54	61.54	63.62	66.18	65.97	63.26
2019	54.49	60.88	61.88	63.87	66.44	66.34	63.55

Source: Word Bank Data Base, 2020




Figure 2: Trend Analyses of Life Expectancy Rate of Seven African Countries

In terms of life expectancy, Nigeria is the lowest, followed by Zambia; South Africa is the third lowest country from 2006. However, it can be concluded that the life expectancy of the seven countries has been within the same range over the periods covered in this study.

Table 3: Comparative Analyses of Human Development Index of Seven African Countries

Year	Nigeria	Angola	Gambia	South Africa	Kenya	Ethiopia	Zambia
2000	0.470	0.387	0.38	0.630	0.283	0.451	0.432
2001	0.389	0.401	0.39	0.610	0.298	0.456	0.440
2002	0.491	0.418	0.40	0.617	0.306	0.456	0.449
2003	0.491	0.429	0.41	0.615	0.306	0.468	0.460
2004	0.470	0.442	0.41	0.613	0.325	0.480	0.469
2005	0.470	0.455	0.42	0.614	0.346	0.490	0.480
2006	0.480	0.471	0.42	0.616	0.362	0.505	0.492
2007	0.480	0.492	0.43	0.621	0.378	0.514	0.503
2008	0.490	0.502	0.43	0.633	0.394	0.523	0.517
2009	0.490	0.522	0.43	0.642	0.401	0.533	0.533
2010	0.500	0.520	0.44	0.649	0.423	0.543	0.544
2011	0.500	0.535	0.43	0.659	0.423	0.552	0.556
2012	0.500	0.543	0.44	0.657	0.430	0.559	0.569
2013	0.540	0.554	0.45	0.675	0.438	0.566	0.574
2014	0.504	0.564	0.45	0.685	0.455	0.572	0.580
2015	0.527	0.572	0.45	0.692	0.451	0.578	0.583
2016	0.530	0.577	0.46	0.696	0.457	0.585	0.586
2017	0.532	0.581	0.46	0.699	0.463	0.590	0.588
2018	0.533	0.591	0.47	0.614	0.460	0.543	0.589
2019	0.534	0.561	0.47	0.579	0.416	0.532	0.553

Source: World Bank Data Base, 2020




Figure 3: Trend Analyses of human development index of Seven African Countries

In terms of human development index, it can be concluded that South Africa has the highest human development index, second by Angola, the third country is Nigeria, followed by Zambia, Kenya, Gambia and the lowest is Kenya.

Table 4: Comparative Analyses of Gross Domestic Products of Seven African Countries

Year	Nigeria	Angola	Gambia	South Africa	Kenya	Ethiopia	Zambia
2000	\$69.45B	\$9.13B	\$0.78B	\$353.40B	\$397	\$8.24B	\$3.60B
2001	\$74.03B	\$8.94B	\$0.69B	\$358.07B	\$395	\$8.23B	\$4.09B
2002	\$95.39B	\$15.29B	\$0.58B	\$380.05B	\$390	\$7.85B	\$4.19B
2003	\$104.91B	\$17.81B	\$0.49B	\$384.98B	\$430	\$8.62B	\$4.90B
2004	\$136.39B	\$23.55B	\$0.96B	\$395.60B	\$452	\$10.13B	\$6.22B
2005	\$176.13B	\$36.97B	\$1.03B	\$475.08B	\$512	\$12.40B	\$8.33B
2006	\$236.10B	\$52.38B	\$1.05B	\$494.02B	\$686	\$15.28B	\$12.76B
2007	\$275.63B	\$65.27B	\$1.28B	\$538.62B	\$826	\$19.71B	\$14.06B
2008	\$337.04B	\$88.54B	\$1.56B	\$586.37B	\$902	\$27.07B	\$17.91B
2009	\$291.88B	\$70.31B	\$1.45B	\$580.73B	\$905	\$32.44B	\$15.33B
2010	\$363.36B	\$83.80B	\$1.54B	\$604.15B	\$952	\$29.93B	\$20.27B
2011	\$410.33B	\$111.79B	\$1.41B	\$636.36B	\$972	\$31.95B	\$23.46B
2012	\$459.38B	\$128.05B	\$1.42B	\$655.17B	\$1,137	\$43.31B	\$25.50B
2013	\$514.97B	\$136.71B	\$1.38B	\$673.34B	\$1,210	\$47.65B	\$28.05B
2014	\$568.50B	\$145.71B	\$1.23B	\$705.43B	\$1,316	\$55.61B	\$27.15B
2015	\$494.58B	\$116.19B	\$1.35B	\$725.11B	\$1,337	\$64.59B	\$21.24B
2016	\$404.65B	\$101.12B	\$1.47B	\$729.13B	\$1,411	\$74.30B	\$20.95B
2017	\$375.75B	\$122.12B	\$1.50B	\$762.27B	\$1,572	\$81.77B	\$25.87B
2018	\$398.16B	\$101.35B	\$1.62B	\$775.04B	\$1,708	\$84.27B	\$27.01B
2019	\$2,230	\$94.64B	\$1.76B	\$790.44B	\$1,817	\$96.11B	\$23.06B

Source: <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/NGA/nigeria/gdp-gross-domestic-product>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/440699/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-angola>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/457690/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-zambia>




Figure 4: Trend Analyses of human development index of Seven African Countries

In terms of gross domestic products, it can be concluded that South Africa has the highest gross domestic product, second by Kenya, the third country is Nigeria, followed by Zambia, Kenya, Gambia and the lowest is Kenya.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

This study is a theoretical survey of issues around democratic governance and development of African countries. Over the past two decades, as African countries have transitioned from significantly autocratic regimes to increasingly open arrangements of governance, there have been questions about the effectiveness of democratic institutions and practices in supporting the necessary policy and organizational environment for meaningful, economic development. A large and growing number of African countries have steadily improved the organization of elections over the years and introduced institutional reforms that provide more liberties for citizens. What remains doubtful is the extent to which the new institutions are used to pursue development and structural transformation. A number of studies make the conflict view of democracy and development suggesting that decision-making in several new democratic governance is shortsighted. From the analyses in this study over the years, we conclude that democratic governance affects development of African economies.

Policy Implication

For the principle of democracy to be completely embraced for African development, government needs a long term perspectives of effective institution building for structural transformation. Deferring some public consumption is necessary in long term planning. But with better governance accountability and transparency, African democracies can replace the facades of freedom with real liberty and economic development.

One of the central challenges for donors therefore remains to become more fully aware of the fact that, when they make choices about how to support democracy and how to promote development, they also need to take into consideration how their activities in one realm affect the other and how these in turn affect (or be impacted by) broader state-building efforts that may or may not work holistically with democratization efforts on the one hand and development efforts on the other.

Democracy should not be viewed as the dictatorship of the majority but the protection of the minority by taking into account their preoccupations. Indeed, minorities may have constructive proposals that the ruling party should examine and incorporate into its political programme. Thus, state building and democracy building should be simultaneous and complementary tasks. These are crucial in ensuring sustainable growth

Therefore, we are not proposing an authoritarian regime but a kind of consensus among political groups to build a strong state before democracy can take hold. As most of the countries are already engaged in democratization process, the African ruling class should seek a consensus around growth and development issues rather than just control the power

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